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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-EMINENT DOMAIN-REsTRIcTIoN OF APARTMENT-HousEs
AS AESTHETIC UsF-A state statute provided for the designation of residence
districts by city councils, from which apartment-houses and other unwelcome
erections were excluded. Compensation was provided for the property owners
who might be out of pocket thereby. The plaintiff, after being refused a permit
to build an apartment-house in a restricted district, brought mandamus against
the inspector of buildings to compel the issuance of one. Held, that the writ
should be refused, this being a public use and a proper subject for the exercise
of eminent domain. Brown and Dibbell, JJ., dissenting. State v. Houghton
(192o, Minn.) 176 N. W. 159.
In the original hearing the court held this to be an aesthetic use merely, and
not a public use, classing it with the billboard cases. State v. Houghton (rip9,
Minn.) 174 N. W. 885. The same court had previously held that such statutes
restricting the building privileges of property owners were not to be sustained
under the police power. State v. Houghton (1916) 134 Minn. 226, 158 N. W. 1017.
No previous decision has been found openly holding a use admittedly aesthetic,
unaccompanied by any other advantage to the public, to be a proper subject of
eminent domain. Cf. Larremore, Public Aesthetics (19o6) 20 HARV. L. REV. 35.
Yet the use in the instant case is mainly, if not wholly, aesthetic, and the Minne-
sota court, without subterfuge, declares it public. The decision is sound and wel-
come. It is submitted that similar statutes may ultimately be sustained, even in
Minnesota, under the police power. Cf. Freund, Police Power (1904) 165. For
an excellent discussion of the billboard cases, see Terry, Constitutionality of Sta-
tutes Forbidding Advertising Signs on Property (1914) 24 YAi LAW JOURNAL,
I; also (1917) 26 ibid., 426; (1919) 28 ibid., 835.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PRoVIsioN REQUIRING DEFENCE
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE TO BE LEFT TO THE JURY.-Article 23, section 6 of
the Constitution of Oklahoma provides that "the defence of contributory negli-
gence or of assumption of risk shall, in all cases whatsoever, be a question of
fact, and shall at all times be left to the jury." Held, that this provision did not
violate the federal Constitution. Chicago etc. R. R. v. Cole (1920) 40 Sup. Ct. 68.
In the words of Justice Holmes: "There is nothing, however, in the Constitu-
tion of the United States or its Amendments that requires a State to maintain
the line with which we are all familiar between the functions of the jury and
those of the Court." See COMMENTS, supra, p. 896.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-STATE SEDITION ACT VALID.-Prior to the federal
Espionage Act Montana enacted a statute in similar terms, under which the
present petitioner in habeas corpus was convicted. When called on by a mob to
kiss the flag, he had objected that it was "nothing but a piece of cotton with a
little paint on it . . . It might be covered with microbes." Held, that the writ
would not issue, as a state may legislate in protection of the flag. Ex parte Starr
(192o, D. Mon.) 263 Fed. 145.
This case brings out once again, and forcibly, that the question of free speech
is primarily not one of law or constitutionality, but of policy and community
ideals. See (192o) 29 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 337; Hart, Power of Government
over Speech and Press (1920) 29 ibid., 410.
CoNTRAcTS-DiScHA IE-ImPossiB.i.-The plaintiff, a mining company, sued
to recover damages for loss of profits resulting from a breach of the defendant's
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contract to furnish them with continuous electric power. The defendant com-
pany sought to excuse themselves by showing that the interruptions in the service
were due to the inability to obtain proper insulators owing to the war, and that
they made diligent effort to, and did procure other insulators as soon as possible.
Held, that the plaintiff should recover. Coal District Power Co. v. Katy Coal Co.
(192o, Ark.) 217 S. W. 449.
The defence set up in the instant case is that usually known as impossibility of
performance, but more accurately described as greatly increased difficulty. See
Corbin, Discharge of Contracts (1913) :2 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 513, 519; (1918)
27 ibid., 953. Anything short of absolute physical or legal impossibility is usually
held an insufficient excuse, and the court reached that result here by construing
it as a contract to furnish electricity at all events. For a discussion of impos-
sibility with respect to war contracts, see COMMENT (1919) 28 ibid., 399.
CONTRACTs-SuRETY BOND TO SECURE PERFORMANcE-LABoRERS AS THIRD-PARTY
BENEFIciAmuEs.-The defendant company executed a bond to the state to secure
performance of a contract for building a highway. The bond was conditioned
on such performance by the contractor, and also, in a separate clause, on pay-
ment by the contractor of every laborer employed. A laborer who had not been
paid by the contractor brought suit against the surety on the bond. Held, that
no one other than the state can maintain suit on the bond. Fosnire v. National
Surety Co. (May, i92o, N. Y. Ct. App.) not yet officially reported.
In two similar cases the Supreme Court of Ohio has lately held that laborers
and material men can maintain suit on such bond as the intended beneficiaries
thereof. See COMMENTS, supra, p. 914.
DFEs-DFLIVERY-DESCENT AN DisT~iBuroN.-The grantor owned farm land
and certain lots. Several years before his death he and his wife executed deeds,
conveying to each of his children a remainder in equal parts of his property, ex-
cepting one, to whom he conveyed a life estate with remainders in her brothers
and sisters. Each deed recited that it was not to take effect during the life-time
of the grantors. The grantor then delivered the deeds to his attorney and
directed him to deliver them at his death to the respective grantees. After his
death the daughter to whom he had conveyed a life estate brought a bill for the
partition of this real estate, alleging that the grantor had died seized of all the
real estate and that it had descended to his heirs at law. Held, that there was
a good delivery of the deeds and the estate of which the grantor died seized was
not an estate of inheritance. Bullard v. Sudmeier (1920, Ill.) 126 N. E. 117.
For a discussion of the validity of such delivery and of other similar recent
cases, see COMMENT (192o) 29 YALE LAw JoURNAL, 549; and Ballantine, Delivery
of Deeds in Escrow (192o) 29 YALE LAW JoU NAL, 826.
EQUITY-QuIETING TITLE-CONTRACT To RENEW LEAsE&-The plaintiff had
leased mining land to the defendant for a period of thirty years, the lease con-
taining an option to renew for a like period upon certain conditions. Suit was
brought five years before the expiration of the first term to have the agreement
to renew cancelled, on the ground that the conditions precedent to the defend-
ant's privilege to renew had not been complied with. Held, that the agreement
to renew did not constitute such a cloud on the title as equity would remove.
Elkhorll Valley Coal Land Co. v. Empire Coal & Coke Co. (192o, App. Div.)
18i N. Y. Supp. 132.
The decision was based on the ground that the record of the lease was not
constructive notice to subsequent purchasers of an incumbrance. It is difficult
to see from a business stand-point how such a power, valid on its face, would
not constitute sufficient danger of a cloud to give equity power to act. See,
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Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed. igig) secs. 2147-2148. A similar option
has been held sufficient to offend against the rule of perpetuities. See CoM1iENT
(igi) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 87. As to a suit to cancel an instrument void on
its face, see (1914) 24 ibid., 82.
INSURANCE-EXEMPTION CLAUSE-DEATH WHILE ENGAGED IN MILITARY SERVICE.
-A life insurance policy exempted the insured from liability except for the
reserve in case of "death while engaged in military or naval service in time of
war, or in consequence of such service." The insured died of pneumonia while
in service during the war. Held, that the plaintiff should recover. Smith, J.
dissenting. Benham v. American Central Life Ins. Co. (I92O, Ark.) 217 S. W.
462.
In a similar policy the exemption clause read "death while engaged in such
[naval or military] service." Held, that the plaintiff should recover. McCulloch,
C. J., and Jones, J. dissenting. Nutt v. Security Ins. Co. of America (192o, Ark.)
218 S. W. 675.
Where the exemption clause implies that exemption shall be conditional upon
proof of a causal connection between the military service and the death, a cause
peculiar to the service must be shown. Kelly v. Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co.
(1919, Wis.) 172 N. W. 152. The defendant must prove the connection con-
clusively. Malone v. State Life Ins. Co. (1919, Mo.) 213 S. W. 877. The instant
cases indicate that where the clause appears merely to cover the time of service,
or even, as in the first case, almost excludes a requirement of a causal connection,
it will be implied by the courts if possible. This is probably just, in view of the
relatively lower death rate in the army from natural causes, but it is difficult to
find any distinction from a recent case in the same court. Miller v. Illinois
Bankers' Life Assn. (1919, Ark.) 212 S. W. 310; cf. also (1918) 28 YALE LAW
JoURNAL, 193.
MUNICIPAL CORiPoRATIONS-GovERNmENTAL FUNCTIONS DISTINGUISHED FROM
MlINsTiLIAITY To ONE INJURED BY THE NEGLIGENT DRIVING OF A HOSE
TRucK.-A hose truck returning to its station was negligently driven by a fire-
man in the employ of the defendant, and the plaintiff was struck and injured.
Held, that the operation of fire apparatus is ministerial and corporate and not
governmental in character, and that the city must pay damages to the plaintiff.
Fowler v. City of Cleveland (1919, Ohio) 126 N. E. 72.
The court overrules Frederick v. City of Columbus (1898) 58 Oh. St. 538,
51 N. E. 35. See COMMENTS, supra, p 911.
RESTRAINT OF TRADE-CoLD STORAGE BEYOND STATUTORY LImIT-PwEs OF
EQuITY.-A Cold Storage Act provided that if an owner of certain food products
should store them for as long as six months, it should be illegal for him to offer
them for sale thereafter. An Anti-Trust Act made combinations of two or more
persons to restrict trade, raise prices, or prevent competition punishable by civil
damages and by fine and imprisonment. Equity jurisdiction had been conferred
upon the lower court to enforce the latter Act. A packing company stored 15o,-
ooo pounds of pork with a warehouse company for more than six months, and
at suit of the State the lower court granted an injunction against sale of the
pork by the owner and appointed a receiver with direction to sell the pork in the
market. Held, that this decree was within the court's equity powers, even though
no statute authorized the particular remedy. Columbus Packing Co. v. State
(1919, Ohio) i26 N. E. 291.
See COMMENTS, upra, p. 913.
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SPECIFIC PERFORIANCE-DEFENDANT WILL NOT BE COMPELLED TO BREAK SECOND
CONTRACT.--The plaintiff made a contract with the defendant for the purchase
of real estate. When the time for performance arrived, the defendant refused
to make a deed, as he was under a subsequent contract duty to convey to another,
who had no notice of the contract with the plaintiff.' The plaintiff requested
specific performance of the contract. Held, that specific performance should not
be decreed, with a dictum that equity will not and cannot compel the defendant
to break this second contract even had a conveyance not been made. Saperstein
v. Mechanics' and Farmers' Savings Bank of Albany (192o, N. Y.) 126 N. E. 708.
It would seem that this dictum is unsound, as the plaintiff and the second
purchaser have equal equities and the equity of the plaintiff, being prior in time,
should prevail.
STATUTE OF LIMtlTATIONS-REVIVAL OF OLD DEBT.-The plaintiff had conveyed
to the defendant a tract of coal land. The consideration had not been paid,
and after the statute of limitations had run, the defendant promised to pay a
much larger sum for the same land. Held, that this subsequent promise, even
though verbal and for a larger consideration than the original promise, revived
the old debt. Abdill v. Abdill (ig2o, Ill.) 126 N. E. 543.
The plaintiffs were the grandchildren of the defendant's housekeeper, to whom
the defendant was indebted for $3,9oo for services rendered in the past. After
the death of the housekeeper and the running of the statute of limitations, the
defendant verbally promised to pay the housekeeper's daughter the $3,9o, pay-
able at the death of the defendant if she survived him, otherwise to her children,
the plaintiffs. Held, that the plaintiffs should not recover because the subsequent
promise had to be in writing because of a statute; also because the existing
debt was not consideration for a promise by the debtor to pay the heirs of the
creditor, since such promise could not bind the creditor's estate. Mortenson v.
Knudson (192o, Iowa) 176 N. W. 892.
The directors of the plaintiff corporation ttirned over a sum of money to its
president to pay its debts without specifying any particular debts. The president,
who owned all the stock in the defendant corporation, paid a claim of the de-
fendant which had been barred by the statute. This suit was brought to recover
the money so paid. Held, that the plaintiff could not recover. Kelly Asphalt
Block Co. v. Brooklyn Alcatraz Asphalt Co. (192o, App. Div.) i8o N. Y. Supp.
8o5.
For discussion of the interesting questions here involved with reference to the
revival of debts barred by the statute of limitations, see COMMENT (1915) 24 YALE.
LAW JOURNAL, 24z; see COMMENT (igig) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 817; (1919)
29 YALE LAW JOUJRNAL, 237; (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 804.
SUErTYSHIP-JOINT PRoMsops-DEFENcEs.-The plaintiff sued on a written
document by which, in consideration of the plaintiff's making advances 
to the
Interboro Brewing Company, the defendant assumed "a joint and several 
liability
with said company for the repayment" of advances made in pursuance of 
this
agreement. The defendant set up several matters which would amount 
to a
defence for a surety. To these defences the plaintiff demurred. Held, 
that the
defences were good. Fischer v. Mahland (192o, App. Div.) 181 N. Y. Supp. i79.'
It has been held that where one becomes a joint obligor with another 
his
promise cannot be within the statute of frauds as a promise to 
answer for the
debt of another. Gibbs v. Blanchard (1867) 15 Mich. 292. In so holding 
the
court sacrificed substance to mere form. See Anson, Contract 
(3d Am. ed. by
Corbin, 1919) 388 note. In the instant case the court declares that the 
promise
"is not strictly a guaranty," but it very properly holds that the contract 
is one
of suretyship and that the defendant has the usual defences of a surety.
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TAXATION-MEMBERSHIP IN NEW YORK STociK EXCHANGE AS TAXABLE PROP-
ERTY-TAXATION AT DOMICIL OF OWNER.-The plaintiff was owner of a seat on
the New York Stock Exchange, his domicil being in Ohio. He sued to enjoin
the listing for taxation in Ohio of the membership in the exchange. Held, that
such membership was personal property and was taxable at the domicil of the
owner under a statute that "All real or personal property in this state ....
and all moneys, credits, investments in bonds, stocks, or otherwise, of persons
residing in this state, shall be subject to taxation." Anderson v. Durr (igig,
Ohio) 126 N. E. 57.
See COMMENTS, supra, p. 916.
TORTS-JOINT TORT-FEASORS-RELEASE OF ONE OR COVENANT NOT TO SUE AS A
DISCHARGE OF OTHERS.-The plaintiff was injured by the concurring fault, as he'
claimed, of the defendant and two railway companies. In consideration of $7,500
he made a written covenant not to sue one of the railway companies, expressly
reserving his right of action against the others. Held, that this did not bperate
as a discharge of the defendant. Adams Express Co. v. Beckwith (1919, Ohio)
126 N. E. 300.
The plaintiff was riding on a truck laden with inflammable waste and was
severely burned when the waste caught fire. The plaintiff alleges that the fire
was caused by the falling of the defendant's defective trolley wire upon the
truck; but there was a possibility that the truck driver was concurrently negli-
gent. In consideration of $75 the plaintiff executed a sealed release of the owner
of the truck, without reservation. Held, that the defendant was also thereby
released, even though the owner of the truck was not in fact responsible for the
injury and the defendant was so responsible. Cormier v. Worcester St. Ry. Co.
(I919, Mass.) 125 N. E. 549.
See COMMENTS, supra, p. 9O9.
TORTS-NEGLIGENcE-LAST CLEAR CHANCE.-The plaintiff's decedent was driv-
ing a dump cart along a road in the center of which was a double-track trolley
line. The decedent turned to cross the tracks when a car was approaching about
three hundred feet away at more than twenty miles an hour. The motorman
shouted a warning but when it was seen that the decedent would continue to
cross, it was too late to bring the car to a stop. A verdict for the plaintiff was
set aside as being against the evidence. Held, that there was no error. Buijnak
v. Connecticut Co. (i92o, Conn.) IO9 Atl. 244.
See COMMENTS, supra, p. 896.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-LAST CLEAR CHANCE-REQUIRES ONLY MEANS OF KNOWL-
EDGE OF PEU.-Employees of the plaintiff stopped to change an automobile tire
at the side of a road, about three feet away from the defendant's trolley tracks.
It was dark and the headlights of the machine were lighted. While so engaged
two of the employees were killed by the defendant's trolley car which approached
at a speed of fifteen miles an hour, with a low-power light in the place of the
usual high-power light The motorman did not see the decedents until too late
to stop the car. The plaintiff having been compelled to pay compensation to the
-dependents of the decedents sued the defendant company. Held, that the plaintiff
should recover. Tdloclk v. Connecticut Co. (I919, Conn.) io8 At. 556.
See COMMENTS, supra, p. 896.
TORTS--NEGLIGENCE-LAST CLEAR CHANcE-NEcESSITY OF AN OPPORTUNITY TO
Avom HAR, AFTER KNOWLEDGE OR MEANS OF KNOwrEDG.-The plaintiff was
seriously injured by being struck by the defendant's trolley car, while he was
lying asleep at night in the grass by the side of the trolley tracks with one or
both of his feet extending over one of the rails. In an action for damages, the
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trial court charged the jury that although the plaintiff was guilty of continuing
negligence, yet if his position was one which was or ought to have been obvious
to the motorman and if the latter was found to have been negligent, the motor-
man's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury, without reference to the
plaintiff's conduct. Held, that this charge was erroneous as it enabled the jury
to find a verdict for the plaintiff, although the motorman could not have avoided
the accident when the moment arrived at which he knew or should have known
of the presence of the plaintiff. Carlson v. Connecticut Co. (i9ig, Conn.) io8
At. 531.
See COmmENTS, supra, p. 896.
WILLs-REvocATIoN-INTENT OF THE TEsTAToR.-The testator wrote a letter to
his attorney directing him to "Please destroy a will I made in favor of Thomas
Hart." The letter was signed in the presence of two witnesses and was attested
by them. The attorney received the letter but failed to destroy the will. The
statute provided that a will should not be revoked "otherwise than by some other
will in writing or some other writing of the testator declaring such revocation
. . . and executed with the same formalities with which the will was required
by law to be executed or unless such will be . . . destroyed . . . by the testator
himself or by another person in his presence and by his direction." Held, that
the will was not revoked. In re McGil's Will (192o, App. Div.) 18i N. Y. S. 48.
The general rule is that there must be an intention to revoke accompanied by
one of certain physical acts required by the statute. Mere intention to revoke
presently or at a future time is not sufficient. See 3 A. L. R. 833, note; In re
Voorhis' Will (889, Sup. Ct.) 7 N. Y. S. 596, 54 Hun, 637. An instrument not
a will but executed with the same formalities was held to have revoked a pre-
vious will. In re Backus' Will (i9oo, Sup. Ct. App. Div.) 63 N. Y. Supp. 544,
49 App. Div. 41o. The rule is the same under the Wills Act (1837) sec. 20.
Toonter v. Sobinska [i9o7] P. io6. In the instant case the writing was of
sufficient formality had it manifested a present intention to revoke. Tynan v.
Paschal (1863) 27 Tex. 286. At best it intended a destruction of the will by the
attorney not in the presence of the testator as required to constitute a valid
destruction under the wording of the statute.
WILLS-UNDUE INFLUENcE-BuRDEN OF PRooF.-Appeal from probate of a will
on the ground that it was obtained by undue influence. The facts only showed
that the defendants had had ample opportunity to influence the testator. Held,
that the will should stand. Rice v. Rice (1920, Ore.) i88 Pac. 18i.
Mere proof of opportunity to exercise undue influence does not sustain the
burden of proving the same. Sturdevant v. Sturdevant (igig) 92 Ore. 269, 178
Pac. 192; Dozwey v. Guilfoile (i919, Conn.) io7 Atl. 562, (1919) 29 YALi LAw
JoURNAL, 133. For discussion of the probative value of "presumptions" in such
cases, see COMMENT (1916) 26 YAL LAw JoURNAL, 62, 777; (i908) i8 ibid., 55.
Woax}mE.'s ComPENSATION Acr-INJuRY ARiSING "OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT"
-PLAYFUL SHOOTING OF WATcHMAN.-The plaintiff was employed by the defend-
ant to take care of the latter's grounds, to drive off trespassers, and to protect
the property generally. Mischievous boys were shooting air guns from adjoining
land in the general direction of the plaintiff, endangering both the glass in the
defendant's buildings and the plaintiff who was engaged in laying a brick walk.
He drove the boys away and returned to his work on the walk. The boys re-
sumed firing in the hope of being pursued again and the plaintiff was hit by a
shot, for which injury he sought compensation. Held, that compensation should
be granted, as the injury "arose out of the employment." Munro v. Williams
(i920, Conn.) iog Atl. [29.
See COMMENTS, supra, p. 90I.
